In Focus: Global Governance
Pushback to Unilateralism: the China-India-Russia Alliance
As U.S. unilateralism has asserted the role of the United States as the sole global superpower, the rest of the world is exploring a variety of ways of pushing back. One is the creation of several new regional security consortiums which are independent of the U.S. One of the most important is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security alliance led by Russia and China, with several non-voting members including India. Its rising economic, political and military profile this year can serve as a useful lens through which to view this geopolitical pushback. It is based on promoting a multipolar world, distributing power along multiple poles in the international system, such as the United States, Europe, Asia-Eurasia and the Middle East,1 while also promoting the multilateralism of international cooperation.2 In recent years, Russia and China have stepped up their advocacy for a multipolar-multilateral alternative.
Multi-polarity
Russia is promoting its vision of a multipolar world hinging on the consensus-based decision making that it wants steered through global institutions such as the United Nations. Chinese President Hu Jintao has outlined a similar vision. At a caucus of the leaders of Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa in Berlin, Germany in June of 2007 he said: “Developing countries should strengthen cooperation and consolidate solidarity to promote the establishment of a multipolar world and a democratic international relationship.3India, however, treads cautiously between the competing visions of a world with multiple poles of power. As such, it makes a refined distinction between multipolarity and multilateralism, and strongly advocates for the latter. India rejects multipolarity that seeks to challenge U.S. military power, while espousing the need for cooperation in governing international relations. In 2003, India’s External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha outlined the contours of multilateralism: “If globalization is the trend, then multilateralism is its life-sustaining mechanism, for no process will survive without a genuine spirit of multilateralism underlined by the belief that global problems require global solutions globally arrived at. Otherwise, the world faces the risk of repeating the mistakes of the past.”4 He emphatically rejected unilateralism, and pointed out that “Iraq attests to the limits of unilateralism.”5 In October this year, Sonia Gandhi, leader of the ruling Congress Party in India, while on a landmark visit to Beijing, offered her formulation of a world order on which her country agrees with China: “Both China and India seek an open and inclusive world order based on the principles of ‘Panchsheel’ that were founded together by (then Chinese Prime Minister) Zhou Enlai and (India’s founding father) Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954.”6 Later, Panchsheel became the founding charter of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that had claimed to be the third pole of power in the bipolar world.A substantial outcome of this advocacy came about in February 2007 when Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed the Declaration on the World Order in the 21st Century.7 The Declaration called for peaceful coexistence, a just and rational world order, abandonment of unilateralism, and embrace of multilateralism. In its own words, the Declaration stated: “It is necessary to solve differences and disputes in a peaceful way, avoid unilateral action (and) not to resort to the policy of diktat, the threat or use of force…Every country has the right to manage its affairs in a sovereign way and international issues should be resolved through dialogue and consultations on the basis of multilateral collective approaches.”8 Similarly India, in its bilateral relations with China and Russia, boldly spells out its vision of a world of shared governance.
Trilateral Dialogue: China, India and Russia
The growing convergence in the worldview of China, India and Russia brought them into a trilateral dialogue, which in Chinese President Hu’s words would see “the three nations work together for further communication and coordination in major international and regional issues and promote the solution of disputes and differences through dialogue.”9 Russian President Putin, while speaking at the first trilateral summit between China, India and Russia in St. Petersburg, Russia, in July 2006 echoed Hu: “…that discussions held in the trilateral meeting would promote mutual trust not only between India, Russia and China individually, but also at regional and global levels.”10 Beijing and New Delhi accepted Russia’s proposal to hold trilateral summit because “it was beneficial to boosting the cooperation among the three countries as well as maintaining multipolarity … in the world.”11 Former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was the first leader to propose the trilateral relationship between China, India, and Russia during his visit to New Delhi in 1998. The first trilateral summit was followed by a meeting of the foreign ministers of three countries in New Delhi on February 14, 2007. In a joint communiqué, the foreign ministers “expressed their conviction that democratization of international relations is the key to building an increasingly multipolar world order.”12During his recent visit to New Delhi on January 25-26, 2007, as the guest of honor on India’s Republic Day, President Putin further discussed trilateral cooperation with Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh. Later, standing shoulder to shoulder with Singh, he told a news conference in New Delhi: “We want to resolve regional problems in a way acceptable to all sides. We therefore think that there are good prospects for working together in a trilateral format.”13 Indians who have long been beholden to Russia seems to embrace Putin’s trilateral initiative, while remaining skeptical of the Indo-U.S. alliance that is currently in the works. K. Subrahmanyam, India’s foremost observer of strategic affairs, gratefully speaks of Indian pull towards Moscow: “Russia has seen India as a key to Asian stability for the past 50 years, some four decades before George W. Bush’s team reached that conclusion.”14 The formation of trilateral dialogue has already been institutionalized. As part of this dialogue, Chinese, Indian and Russian foreign ministers held their first meeting in June 2005 in Vladivostok, Russia. As noted above, they met again in New Delhi in February 2007. Similarly, the leaders of three countries have been holding trilateral summits on the sidelines of G-8 meetings, of which Russia is a member and at which China and India have been regular invitees since 2006.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
Parallel to the trilateral dialogue, China and Russia took the lead to institutionalize their strategic relations into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which India, together with Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan, is a non-voting member. The six-member SCO is widely seen as a collective security organization for nations in South, Central and West Asia. Some observers view the SCO as a counterbalance to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and its advance into the region. Others believe that “Beijing and Moscow…shared the common aims of…frustrating Washington’s agenda to dominate the (Central Asian) region which had been an integral part of the Soviet Union for three generations.”15 The recent SCO summit on August 16, 2007 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, however, emphasized in a joint communiqué that “modern challenges and security threat can only be effectively countered through united efforts of the international community.”16 There is a range of events that signify the SCO’s rising economic, political and military profile, but five events stand out in this regard:
(a)post-Taliban Afghanistan;
(b) U.S. military presence in central Asia;
(c) SCO’s rapid expansion;
(d) the Caspian Sea Nations Summit; and,
(e) “Peace Mission 2007.”
SCO and post-Taliban Afghanistan
As the SCO asserts for a role in post-Taliban Afghanistan, it wants to see the U.S.-led forces leave Kabul. At its annual summit in July 2005 in Astana, Kazakhstan, the SCO called on the U.S. to give a timetable for a pullout of its troops from Afghanistan. “As the active military phase in the antiterror operation in Afghanistan is nearing completion, the SCO would like the coalition’s members to decide on the deadline for the use of the temporary infrastructure and for their military contingents’ presence in those countries.”17 The SCO’s demands were based on the assumption that the Taliban has been defeated; hence, there is no need for the continued presence of U.S. and NATO troops in the region. The U.S., however, has since built several military bases across Afghanistan, to fight Taliban’s insurgency and al Qaeda’s terrorism. The U.S.’ expanded military presence further fueld suspicions among SCO member states–especially China and Russia–that the U.S. and NATO are in the region for the long haul. The SCO has since begun developing its own Afghan policy with the founding of the Afghanistan Contact Group (ACG) to strengthen relationship between the SCO and Kabul. The Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who regularly attends the SCO’s annual summits, has positively responded to the SCO’s initiative. It is important to note that Karzai’s political support base in the ruling Northern Alliance in Afghanistan continues to be beholden to Russia for the latter’s critical support against the Taliban long before the 9/11 attacks. To this day, the Northern Alliance government kept up its warm relations with the Kremlin. Similarly, the Alliance’s ethnic links with the Central Asian Republics (CARs), especially with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, two member-states of the SCO, also play out in making Afghanistan receptive to the SCO. In return, Afghanistan is showered with economic and military support by China and Russia. In the economic sector, China has become Afghanistan’s anchor. In late November 2007, Kabul gave Beijing the largest-ever mining contract in Afghanistan’s history. Under this 30-year deal, China would invest $3b in the development of copper mines, which are likely to go in production in the next five years, in Afghanistan’s Logar province. This single-stroke Chinese investment of $3b comes close to the entire foreign investment in Afghanistan of just $4b since 2001.18 Militarily, Moscow has continued to be Kabul’s main supplier of weapons and military hardware since 2001. Thus, Kabul’s growing economic and military dependence on China and Russia is further binding it to these nations. That’s why Afghanistan is now poised to become a member of the SCO.
SCO and U.S. Military Presence
While gathering Afghanistan into its embrace, the SCO publicly expresses its unease at the U.S.’s military presence in the region. At its Astana summit, the SCO also called for the closing of U.S. bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Months later, Uzbekistan evicted the U.S. from its air base at Karshi-Khanabad, also known as K-2. At this summit Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov “essentially called on his SCO partners to make a choice between siding with the United States or ‘with our neighbors in Russia and China.’”19The United States, however, continues to keep another air base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, which it has been using for humanitarian and combat operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. has 1,200 troops stationed there. Unsurprisingly, Kyrgyzstan balanced the U.S. military presence on its soil with the hosting of a Russian airbase nearby. As the Russian and U.S. air bases sit only a few miles apart, Russians use this proximity as a strategic vantage point to keep tabs on what goes on at Manas base. There are reports that China also is in talks with Bishkek to open up an airbase of its own in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, Bishkek, which hosted the SCO summit in 2007, has already stopped the U.S. from using Manas base for combat operations. It is now placing additional restrictions on Washington for using the base even for humanitarian relief supplies. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was elected with U.S. support, “called for the United States to start reducing its military presence in the country” as “situation in Afghanistan had stabilized.”20 Bishkek also is under mounting persuasion by Iran to not let its base be used for any hostile action against Tehran.
The Expanding SCO
As the U.S. presence in the region tends to contract, the SCO goes on expanding into an unparalleled Asian-Eurasian Security organization. Its current members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Among its members with observer status are included India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan. As noted before, Afghanistan also is now lining up to become a full-fledged member. So are Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan–two staunch U.S. allies and energy-rich nations. In recognition of the SCO’s growing significance, even the U.S. applied for its membership.21 The application was, however, denied. Yet the SCO won global recognition with a United Nations Assistant Secretary General in attendance at the Bishkek summit this year. The SCO is now linking arms with the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is seen in the west as a Eurasian military pact, to further help advance mutual interests. Both organizations signed a cooperation agreement in 2007. By virtue of this agreement, China has become an unofficial member of the CSTO, which is made up of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Interestingly, all SCO members, except China, are also members of the CSTO. More importantly, Iran, which has applied for SCO membership, has also been invited to join the CSTO. The CSTO also wants a piece of action in Afghanistan, and insists to model the NATO in undertaking global peacekeeping, especially in its “region of responsibility.” In parallel, China and Russia are ready to accept India as a voting member, which will be an upgrade on its current status as an observer. It is interesting to note that China, India and Russia all have made a massive investment in Iran’s energy production sector, which further binds them together. Chinese and Indian oil and gas interests in Iran are respectively valued at $100b and $40b. Russia, for its part, is helping Tehran to build its flagship $1b nuclear reactor in Busher.
The Caspian Sea Summit
In so many ways, Tehran has become a catalyst for the competitive tensions between unipolarists and multipolarists. It can be gauged from the just-concluded second Caspian Sea Summit, which met in Tehran on October 16, 2007. Along the lines of the SCO, Russia is developing an alliance of the Caspian Sea’s littoral states that include Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia. The alliance is seemingly meant to share the natural wealth of the Caspian Sea, which some observers bill as the new Middle East. The 700 mile-long Caspian, which is the world’s largest inland sea, contains six separate hydrocarbon basins. Its proven and potential oil reserves boast 270 billion barrels of oil. In 1994, the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium sealed an $8b deal with Baku to develop three Caspian Sea oil fields with reserves of about 3-5 billion barrels of oil. The deal was to extend over 30 years. There have since been occasional skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Iran over the demarcation of their respective coastlines. The five littoral states now seek a framework to replace the 1921 treaty that first divided the Sea between Iran and the former U.S.S.R. to have an agreed-upon share in its natural bounties.The Tehran summit was meant to achieve this end. The summit was, however, clouded by the worsening standoff between Iran, Europe and the U.S. over Iran’s nuclear program. In this tense atmosphere, Tehran wasted no time in claiming the presence of President Putin, who was the first Russian leader to travel to Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, at the summit as a vindication of its position that its nuclear program had all along been for peaceful purposes. On December 3 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate said: “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its weapons program,” and that “Tehran had not restarted its nuclear-weapons program as of mid-2007.”22 The weapons program is defined as relating to weapons design, weaponization work and covert uranium work. Two weeks after the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released, Russia delivered 80 tons of enriched uranium for Tehran’s Busher nuclear reactor.23 Putin’s visit was, however, widely interpreted as a counterweight to Washington’s persistent opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.24 Putin, too, publicly defended Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear technology. At the summit, he further cheered his Iranian hosts with a call on the summiteers to stand united against outside interference: “We have to build confidence to settle the relevant issues and not even think of resorting to force against each other in the Caspian Sea, or of allowing other countries to avail themselves of our (Caspian) territories.”25 Iranians believe that the U.S. is setting up Azerbaijan to counterbalance Iran. They are also perturbed by U.S. involvement in helping Kazakhstan to build its navy. So are Russians. As a result, there is growing convergence of views between Iran and Russia on keeping the Caspian Sea demilitarized. To further their cooperation beyond the appropriation of the Caspian Sea’s natural wealth, the summit’s member states have formed the Caspian Sea Economic Commission, which is scheduled to meet next year in Moscow with Putin in chair. Not only is the revolving door between the SCO, CSTO and Caspian Sea nations strengthening the Russian and Chinese influence in the region, it is deepening their military and security alliance as well.
Peace Mission 2007
The major manifestation of this deepening alliance was the SCO-wide military maneuvers, dubbed as “Peace Mission 2007.” These maneuvers were conducted on August 9-17, 2007 in Chelyabinsk in Russia’s Urals region, followed by its final phase carried out in Urumuqi, Xinjiang, China. The exercises involved 6,500 troops, 80 aircraft and 500 combat vehicles from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. China and Russia supplied all of the combat vehicles, as well as 3,700 troops. “For the SCO…the war games mark its most ambitious attempt yet to build an integrated military-security apparatus to complement expanding political and commercial collaboration.”26 Some observers suspect that Peace Mission 2007 “resembles less of an anti-terrorism drill than a full-scale, state-on-state conventional fight.”27 The SCO has never held a full-scale military exercise involving all member states, although China and Russia have held several joint exercises under the auspices of the SCO. In 2005, they held large-scale amphibious landings on China’s Yellow Sea Coast, which many observers believed were intended for Chinese separatists in Taiwan.28 These maneuvers, however, were massive in their scope as they were conducted on land, in air, and at sea in southeast of the Shandong Peninsula in China. The stated goal of each drill–held in 2007 and 2005–was to fight separatism and terrorism. China faces problems of separatism in Tibet and Taiwan, and terrorism in Xinjiang, while Russia is confronted with the twin menace in the wide swath of its northern territories. Similarly, India is battling enduring separatist movements in its west and northeast. Although India, which is an observer at the SCO, sat out of the 2007 drills, it was scheduled to hold joint army exercises with China in December 2007 in its southwestern province of Yunnan.29 The planned exercises are being billed as “historic” since the two giants have come a long way from active hostilities to strategic partnership. In their luncheon meeting in Singapore on November 21, 2007, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh further signified the import of these exercises by reiterating their commitment “to take their strategic cooperative partnership to a next level.”30 Prime Minister Singh, in his statement, added that “India and China ties are beyond and above bilateral matters. They are related to peace, stability and prosperity in the region and the world beyond…India and China are…friends and partners.”31 The Indian Prime Minister, who has just returned from his state visit to Moscow, is now scheduled to visit China early next year.
Conclusion
The SCO’s geopolitical pushback to the unipolar-unilateral makeover of the world is, however, defensive. Both China and Russia are being protective of their turf. Their internal divisions caused by “extremism, splitism, and terrorism” further unnerve them at even a slight hint of U.S. or NATO proximity to their “near-abroad.” They have created the SCO and CSTO, and formed the Caspian Sea Alliance to put distance between their respective “spheres of influence” and NATO-US presence. Many argue that this alliance-building is a reaction to U.S. unilateralism. These alliances, however, cannot threaten U.S. security interests in the region. The allied nations have been consistently reassuring the U.S. that their alliances are not directed at “third party.” In fact, SCO member states have helped the U.S. to protect its security interests in the region. In the run-up to U.S. military action in Afghanistan in 2001, the Russian President Putin, according to Bob Woodward, stunned the top U.S. policy makers with his unsolicited offer to let U.S. combat jets use the Russian airspace to strike the Taliban government in Kabul.32 The Bush White House was not even sure if Russians would agree to U.S. airbases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for which it sought Putin’s consent. More importantly, China, which shares a long border with Kyrgyzstan and is next door neighbor to Uzbekistan, went along with the U.S. bases in both countries. Besides, and it is noteworthy for American policy makers, the three nations that broke out in spontaneous outpouring of sympathy for 9/11 victims were not Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, but Russia, Iran and China–in that order–where hundreds of thousands of marchers held candle-lit vigils and mourned the tragic deaths of 3,000 Americans in terrorist attacks. In strictly strategic sense, the U.S. by itself and together with its allies, especially Australia, Britain and Japan, continues to be the dominant force in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, which are the key sources and supply routes of energy shipments for China and trade goods for Central Asia. This makes China and the region vulnerable to U.S. retaliation in the event of any perceived or real threat to U.S. security interests. Yet the Asian-Eurasian regional powers, which are coalescing into the SCO, CSTO and Caspian Alliance, have the potential to entangle U.S. economic interests, especially energy interests. On this score too, the U.S. has been able to circumvent such potential challenges by establishing bilateral relations with the region’s energy-rich nations, particularly Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Of these, Kazakhstan is the richest nation, with three-fourths of the region’s oil and about half of its gas reserves; Azerbaijan owns one-sixth of the region’s oil and10 percent of gas reserves; and Turkmenistan possesses close to half of the region’s gas and 5 percent of oil reserves. In 1993, Chevron concluded a $20b deal with Kazakhstan to develop its Tengiz oil field, which is estimated to contain recoverable oil reserves of 6-9 billion barrels of oil. An $8b Azerbaijan International Consortium, led by BP-Amoco-Statoil, is already developing oil fields off the shores of Azerbaijan. Similarly, the U.S. has successfully pushed for a multi-billion dollar Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline as an alternative to the $10b Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline. Above all, the U.S. enjoys worldwide economic and military superiority that allows it to force its way through closed doors, if needed. As the world’s strongest nation, multilateralists argue, the United States serves its interests best when it works in a multilateral framework on which China, India and Russia all agree. A starting point for multilateralism can be war-torn Afghanistan where the SCO and CSTO both want a piece of action. The U.S. should welcome both to share in counter-insurgency operations for which both China and Russia have a long-standing career. This will free up 25,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, which can be exclusively deployed for counter-terrorism; while NATO forces can undertake reconstruction work that has long remained frozen. If it happens, it will turn Afghanistan into the North Star of multilateralism. To the U.S.’ further advantage, India’s alliance with China and Russia would privilege multilateralism over multipolarism. The latter, as Indian Foreign Minister Sinha in his 2003 address cautioned, has the potential to reprise the cold war rivalries that could set the world on a dangerous course. Multilateralism, on the other hand, would further strengthen the continuing economic integration worldwide, and thus lay the foundation for political integration as well.
1. John Van Oudenaren, “Unipolar versus Unilateral: Confusing Power with Purpose,” Policy Review, April-May, 2004.
2. John Van Oudenaren, “What is Multilateral?” Policy Review, February-March, 2003.
3. President Hu Jintao Had a Collective Meeting With the Leaders of India, Brazil, South
Africa and Mexico.” Available online at:
http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/zgbd/t329817.htm
4. “Push for Multipolar World Need Not Be Confrontationist.” The Hindu, October 19, 2003. Available online at:
http://www.thehindu.com/2003/10/19/stories/2003101903231000.htm
5. ibid
6. “India and China–a Harmony of Civilizations.” Available online at:
http://www.hindu.com/nic/soniachina.htm
7. “China-Russia Joint Statement on 21st Century World Order.” Political Affairs
Magazine. Available online at: http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/1455/1/108
9. “China Russia India Trilateral Summit,” People’s Daily, July 18, 2006.
12. “India China Russia call for Fairer World Order.” Reuters, February 14, 2007.
13. Rachel Douglas, “Nuclear Power Tops Putin’s Agenda in India.” Executive Intelligence
14. K. Subrahmanyam, “The Lessons From Putin’s Visit.” Rediff.com, Jan. 29, 2007.
15. Dilip Hiro, “Reordering the World Order.” Guardian, August 20, 2007.
16. “Iran Leader Denounces U.S. Missile Shield Plan,” International Herald Tribune,
17. “Timetable Urged for U.S. to Pull Out of Central Asia.” The Boston Globe, July 6,
18. “China Wins Mega Afghan Project.” BBC News, November 25, 2007
19. Ramtanu Mitra, “Central Asia Battle Lines Being Drawn,” Executive Intelligence
22. “Less Scary Than We Thought?” The Economist, December 4, 2007. Available online
at: http://www.economist.com/world/africa/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=10238608
23. “Russia Ships Nuclear Fuel to Iran.” BBC News, December 17, 2007.
24. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, “Caspian Summit a Triumph for Iran and a Victory for Russia.”
Japan Focus. Available online at: http://japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2552
25. “Caspian Sea Summit in Tehran Ends with Final Declaration,” Deutsche Presse
26. “Putin’s Politics Put Partners on Edge,” Guardian, August 10, 2007.
27. “Russian Military: Peace Mission 2007,” March 29, 2007. Available online at:
http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/?dept=732&id=44272
28. John Daly, “SCO to Host Peace Mission 2007 Anti-terrorist Drill in August,” July 27,
2007. Available online at: http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372326
29. “China, India Plan Joint Military Exercise.” China Daily, November 22, 2007.
32. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).
———————————————————————————————————-
The Future of Peacekeeping
Peace operations continue to be one of the most visible areas of activity of the United Nations, one which the international organization can have a critical impact. Consider, for instance, that peacekeeping operations are growing. In October 2004, the surge in peacekeeping activity raised the number of peacekeepers to 54,200. The number of civilian police also increased to 5,900 and the civilian staff to 11,600. By the fall of 2005, the 18 operations around the world employed 83,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel – a more-or-less fivefold increase in the field personnel since 2000. By the fall of 2006, the deployment number had reached an all-time high of 93,000 men and women.
At the same time, peacekeeping operations are becoming more complex and comprehensive. In particular, with many of their tasks increasingly focusing on peacebuilding in post-conflict transitions, peace operations are now linked to longer-term development approaches, which call for integrated programs both within and outside the UN system. The UN Peacebuilding Commission was created to meet these new needs by strategically coordinating the actions of the different actors involved in peacekeeping. Although peacekeeping operations are growing in size and complexity, they have not experienced an equivalent increase in political and financial support from member countries. The leading Western powers remain reluctant to take a leading role in expanding UN operations. The current U.S. ambivalence toward the UN is perhaps the most crippling factor. And unfortunately, that ambivalence is not likely to undergo a fundamental shift any time soon.
Uphill Battle
Despite the expansion of operations, the peacekeeping picture is not an entirely rosy one. The challenges are multifold. They entail the limited resources that peacekeeping mobilizes, the way it functions (or not), and how it is being called upon by member states. In fact, peacekeeping is so much of an uphill battle that its capacity to address the security and humanitarian crises associated with failed or failing states is questionable. In recent years Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the current under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, has repeatedly said that issues of resources and modus operandi are critical for peacekeeping and yet so difficult to address in a satisfactory manner. Indeed, getting the right capabilities, including troops, specialized components, and other personnel, on the ground to implement the mandates, making them available not simply over the duration of the missions but also in the early, crucial phase of deployment, can mean the difference between success and failure. But all too often such capabilities are not found, let alone on time. For instance, the UN/African Union “hybrid” mission for Darfur (UNAMID) has been badly hurt by the refusal of militarily capable nations to provide the two dozens helicopters required, at the least, for operations in Darfur. No NATO country has offered even one helicopter. Equally if not more challenging are the organizing of these capabilities in the field and the integrating and rationalizing of the joint efforts of the UN system and the rest of the international community to assist the consolidation of a sustainable peace by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This state of affairs derives from operational difficulties specific to UN peacekeeping, such as the challenge of solving the discrepancy between the financing of different activities for today’s complex operations. For example, certain activities are traditionally covered by assessed contributions, while reconstruction or development activity must rely on voluntary contributions. Integrating and rationalizing peacekeeping activities is also hampered by the lack of systematically accumulated knowledge of lessons learned. Although the UN has been doing peacekeeping, including conflict prevention, for more than 50 years, its ad hoc approach tends to deprive it of time-tested templates on how to proceed to secure success. But it is the attitude of member states toward peacekeeping that is perhaps the biggest obstacle. First, member states tend to ask the UN to handle security and humanitarian crises that they do not want to tackle themselves. In this regard, UN peacekeeping appears sometimes to be a dumping ground for the most enduring problems. Second, while member states are quick to hand over problems to the UN, they resist giving appropriate resources to address them. Beyond the adoption of resolutions in the Security Council, they are often unwilling to offer sufficient political, financial, logistical, or military support. Against this background, and considering that the crises on which UN peacekeeping operations focus are usually part and parcel of intractable conflicts, it is no surprise that they have mixed results. The attitude of the permanent members of the Security Council occupies a prime of place in this context. And, more specifically, as Russia and China are still in the back seat when it comes to UN peace operations – although in recent years China has increased its contribution to UN peacekeeping and became in 2006 the 13th-largest contributor of UN peacekeepers – this concerns first and foremost the three Western permanent members of the Council. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, United Kingdom, and France have been the most active in peacekeeping. But they have measured their involvement against a narrowly understood national interest. As a result, their support has been at best tentative and at worst crippled by a reluctance to take much risk. In this ambiguous commitment of leading Western powers to UN peace operations, the United States has a central role. Indeed, if there is one country that wrestles with the challenge of balancing obligations that the national and international realms entail, it is America.
American Ambivalence
In the 1990s, the United States, without a doubt, had a positive impact on the search for solutions to humanitarian crises. In most instances with international involvement, America’s role proved to be essential. Although never as decisive as in more traditional types of conflict such as Operation Desert Storm, U.S. participation was decisive enough at least to get the international community engaged in the crises. This was particularly true for Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. In Bosnia, it took America’s commitment to a solution to the conflict, in the spring of 1995, for the war to end. In Kosovo, the U.S. decision to launch a NATO air campaign was central to international involvement there, and it paved the way for the subsequent UN operation. As for East Timor, the political pressure exercised by the American government on Djakarta and the logistical support given to Australian forces were key for the deployment of international forces on the island. There is however a less inspiring side to this story that concerns American shortcomings and their negative effects on UN peace operations. In this story, the United States oscillated between reluctant leadership and outright refusal to get involved. Rwanda is of course one of the most dramatic examples of how American refusal to get involved in humanitarian crises can have negative consequences. In spring 1994, a few months after the Somalia fiasco and at a time when the Clinton administration was issuing restrictive guidelines on UN peacekeeping, the Rwandan tragedy had little chance of attracting the attention of the White House. This was particularly the case given that the United States had no geopolitical interests strong enough to warrant intervention. Throughout the 1990s, the Clinton administration was willing to factor in the emerging complexities of the post-Cold war era and extend the realm of concerns beyond a traditionally defined national interest. Nevertheless it was unwilling to do so more than marginally. Later, under the Republican administration, the U.S. approach got worst. Radicalizing attitudes that had already existed in American foreign policy toward the UN, its policies and values, President Bush made a unilateral and security-driven conception of international affairs the hallmark of his foreign policy at the outset of his presidency. September 11 and the decision to invade Iraq only further systematized this conception. Consequently, the current administration never viewed UN peacekeeping as a valuable tool in itself. If it dovetailed with America’s agenda and interest, as partly happened in Afghanistan, cooperation between the UN and the United States was a possibility. Beyond this, the U.S. government was willing to allocate only the minimal amount of resources to UN peacekeeping.
Paying the Costs
Seven years into Bush’s presidency, its handling of international security crises has proved to be far from a success, to say the least. Moreover, failed states and the ethnic tensions often associated with them continue to sprout around the globe. By the mid-2000s, although the number of total of conflicts has declined, the number of internal conflicts has increased to represent 95% of all conflicts worldwide. Thus the international community now stands at an ominous crossroads. Unless the international community and its principal powers – the United States to begin with – are to ignore failing and failed states altogether, inevitably they will have to address conflicts and humanitarian crises stemming from them. As such, neither the United States nor the international community will be able to escape the need for peace operations. Financially costly they may be, but not nearly as costly as unsuccessful unilateral interventions. For instance, the estimated total cost of peacekeeping operations from July 1 2007 to June 30 2008 is $7 billion. In comparison, the estimated war-related spending for Iraq has risen from $53 billion in 2003 to $133 billion in 2007. And these financial costs don’t take into account the political costs of such unilateral interventions to the international legitimacy of the United States and other relevant actors, whether states or international organizations. Peace operations are therefore a necessity and a resource that should be used. And now is the time to assess how they can be best effective. Now is the time, also, to examine what it would take for member states and the UN to truly make peace operations part of a comprehensive portfolio of measures, from conflict prevention to post-building reconstruction. Beyond the specifics of how America can contribute operationally to the success of peacekeeping, the U.S. government can meet its international responsibilities only by fundamentally altering its foreign policy. To take UN peace operations seriously and consequently invest strategically in them, the United States needs to become aware, at the general level of international affairs, of the necessity to link more closely power and legitimacy as well as solidarity and security. In turn, this entails several fundamental changes in the ways American foreign policy is conceptualized and implemented. They include: finding a better balance between national and international interests; coming to terms with the foreign policy implications of U.S. democratic values; exercising leadership within multilateral constraints; and overcoming the parochial characteristics of American foreign policy.
Prospects Dim
What are the chances for these changes to happen as well as for peacekeeping to become a better tool of conflict management in the near future? The chances are, admittedly, rather slim, for three fundamental reasons. First, the foreign policy of the Bush administration since 2001 departs in practically every respect from the directions advocated here, and this will not change until the end of 2008. Furthermore, it is uncertain that American foreign policy will evolve even beyond the current administration. After all, the Bush administration foreign policy has not been a revolution but rather a radical version of enduring strains in American foreign policy and its conception of the country’s place in the world. Second, there is no serious desire among member states to discuss how to trigger change, followed by real action. This applies to peacekeeping. As such, the gap between rhetoric and reality remains a major issue, unlikely to be solved any time soon at the global level. The mere fact that UN reform is a constant item on the multilateral agenda shows how little progress is being done in this area. Third, and finally, it is difficult to see how the UN secretariat, short of benefiting from a very strong financial and political commitment from member states, can address and redress on its own the systemic shortcomings of peacekeeping operations. More than 15 years after the end of the Cold War, international life is still crippled by conflicts. Peacekeeping operations have expanded to meet some of these challenges. While some of the shortcomings of peacekeeping can be placed on the UN’s shoulders, the main problem lies with the strongest member states. In this perspective, only when the United States decides to recognize international constraints and play by the global rules will the multilateral management of conflict improve. It will be interesting to see if the new U.S. administration scheduled to take charge in Washington in January 2009 will be lucid enough to acknowledge this state of affairs and introduce the necessary changes. Jean-Marc Coicaud heads the UN University Office at the United Nations in New York. He is the author of Beyond the National Interest: The Future of UN Peacekeeping and Multilateralism in an Era of U.S. Primacy (Washington, D.C., USIP Press, 20007) among other publications. He has held a variety of positions, with the French diplomatic service, the European Parliament, various universities, and the UN, in Europe, the United States, and Asia. Formerly part of the speechwriting team of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org). He can be reached at: jeanmarc@ony.unu.edu
———————————————————————————————————–
Efficacy, Wind-Blowing, and the Favored Villain
We would like to thank Daniel Millenson for his contribution to this dialogue on divesting from Sudan. Both the idea of linking investment decisions with human rights as well as the targeted nature of this campaign, reflecting a concern to avoid harming civilians, are commendable.
However, activists, in the development of campaigns, must also be informed by efficacy in order to use limited time and resources in ways that are most likely to bring about the desired change. In this sense, the Sudan divestment movement fails on two grounds. First, the campaign’s focus is highly indirect. It aims to influence the policies of mostly Chinese businesses, something that U.S. activists are only marginally positioned to accomplish given the tenuous links involved. Would anyone have seriously advocated that Chinese activists dedicate themselves to pushing a campaign to divest from U.S.-based Chevron, a company who’s oil-related activities in the 1980s in Sudan did much to fuel the country’s brutal north-south civil war? Second, contrary to popular belief, and Washington’s own wind-blowing, the United States has done very little to actually address the conflict in Darfur, not even small, obvious steps which involve little more than cutting a check. As such, aid organizations in Darfur constantly operate on the brink of disaster, and have at times had to cut food rations for starving refugees. The ever-maligned African Union (AU) mission in Darfur has endured months without even being able to pay its troops, and lacks the most basic logistical equipment. Pushing for funding for these groups is a concrete, direct goal, avoiding the convoluted nature of divesting from Chinese oil companies. And it’s one that Darfur activists have largely failed to pursue in any meaningful way. This isn’t to say that divestment cannot achieve any results, and Millenson points justifiably to the departure of Rolls Royce as a success of the movement. However, given the above, and that Sudan is cited as among the 20 least trade-dependent nations, and its macroeconomy is booming, there are clearly more sensible goals for activists. As Millenson quite correctly notes, there are “too many vital economic interests…at stake to alter Darfur’s bloody status quo.” What this formulation excludes is that the both economic and geopolitical interests that have impeded international action on Darfur do not belong only to China, the favored villain. The same factors also drive U.S. policy in Sudan and elsewhere, which is clear enough from Washington’s strategic alliance [http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc//2006/0402rubin.htm] with nefarious elements of the Sudanese government as part of the supposed “War on Terror,” and its cuddly relationships with brutal, often oil-producing regimes the world over, perhaps none more reprehensible than the Obiang dictatorship in Equatorial Guinea. Tellingly, there is no mass movement to divest from this “ruthless” (in the CIA’s own words) regime, which exports nearly two-thirds of its oil production to the United States, two phenomena of more than casual relation. Instead, Millenson’s analysis coalesces quite snugly with the establishment-friendly narrative attacking China, and China alone, for being “crude-thirsty” and lamenting that it “was long content to stay mum on Darfur,” but has been “galled by western outcry.” It’s a reassuring story, but an incomplete one with little basis in the factual record. Kevin Funk and Steve Fake are social justice activists who are currently writing a book about Darfur. They maintain a blog with their commentary called “confronting empire“. They are contributors to Foreign Policy In Focus.
For More Information
This strategic dialogue consists of two original pieces — Kevin Funk and Steve Fake’s Divestment: Solution or Diversion? and Daniel Millenson’s Divestment: Ending the Genocide in Darfur — and two responses, this one and Daniel Millenson’s Changing the Subject.
————————————————————————————————————-
Myanmar, the UN, and ASEAN
United Nations envoy Ibrahim Gambari’s latest round of intense shuttle diplomacy since September’s “saffron revolution” produced no major breakthroughs in Yangon. It merely confirmed the suspicions of close Myanmar watchers that the military junta has no intentions to change its ways or compromise with anyone.
The regime, known officially as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), moved to expel the UN’s top resident diplomat Charles Petrie even before Gambari set foot in Myanmar following his six-nation tour for diplomatic consultations. (The UN’s Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, who has been barred from Myanmar since 2003, however, returned there on Nov. 11 as scheduled). The SPDC also rejected Gambari’s offer of tripartite talks between the UN, ruling junta, and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Worst of all, Gambari was rebuffed by the junta leader Senior General Than Shwe, who had kept Gambari waiting for three days during his previous visit. This time, the self-effacing diplomat endured a scolding by information minister Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan, who accused the UN of being pro-West and in favor of the sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union, and Australia.
ASEAN Meetings
Myanmar’s government is counting on its ASEAN allies to shore up support at the upcoming Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meetings in Singapore. The government threw open its doors to welcome ASEAN journalists earlier than planned. A group of 18 reporters went on a chaperoned Myanmar jaunt and stopped-over at Naypitaw—the fairytale capital city—in the hopes that ASEAN will approve of the regime’s version of “flourishing discipline.” And Myanmar’s new Prime Minister Thein Sein sought out friends in socialist Laos and Vietnam on a recent visit billed by the junta as introductory courtesy calls. Singapore, the current ASEAN chair, will host both Thein Sein and Gambari at the East Asia Summit on November 21. Barring last minute changes, it will be the first time since the crisis began in August that a senior Myanmar government official will participate in high-level talks with all major players with a direct stake in resolving it. The next steps forward could emerge from these meetings even though America and the European Union are technically excluded from the summit. The immediate goals by all the international parties concerned can be summed up as this: A genuine, broad-based and substantive dialogue between the SPDC, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy Party, and ethnic minority groups; real, verifiable progress toward national reconciliation; and a lifting of restrictions on Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners. In short, there should be no returning to the unsustainable status quo, as Gambari put it.
UN May Break Deadlock
Whether the ongoing diplomatic efforts will eventually yield a peaceful transition to democracy and civilian-led rule remains to be seen. What’s critical for the international community is to brainstorm strategies in the same collaborative spirit that resulted in the recent unanimous UN Security Council statement deploring the Myanmar government’s violent response to peaceful demonstrations. In having China sign on to the criticism, the statement was unprecedented. While there will always be competing strategic interests by the various players, it would be a mistake for some—the United States, UK, China, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia—to hijack the process from the UN. Gambari, a Nigerian, is a seasoned negotiator with a track record to match the Myanmar military’s 40-year reign, and he remains the best hope to break the political deadlock that has spanned two decades. Gambari has not fully spelled out his political blueprint for Myanmar yet, though he claims there will be incentives to persuade the government to make meaningful concessions. So far, Thailand has proposed four power talks that involve the UN, China, ASEAN, and India. Yet others want to form a “Core Group” consisting of the Five Permanent Security Council Members, Japan, India, Singapore, and Norway that has long taken a traditional interest in Myanmar. Missing from all this is the Indonesian model, which has received too little international attention so far. Gambari’s discussions with the authorities in Jakarta could form the basis of future negotiations. The Indonesian model represents an in-house prototype for political transition and reforms that could most influence the junta, which is averse to “neocolonialist” intervention.
Indonesian model
Indonesia and the former Burma fraternized in the Asian-African Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Cold War’s Nonaligned Movement. Before that, Burma’s nationalist heroes smuggled arms to Jakarta to help it defeat the Dutch. Jakarta can and should repay its old friend. The economic and political destinies of the two nations could not have been more different, but they are also the same. Their economic base is largely agrarian, their societies are large and ethnically diverse, their cultural ethos is parallel, and Buddhism and Islam are major moral forces in their politics. The symmetry in politics goes beyond the authoritarian political system and can be seen in their persistent struggles with rebellious provinces and even more rebellious pedigreed daughters of the opposition. They are two sides of the same coin. Indonesia’s reformasi movement of 1998 came to pass because it had what Myanmar lacked in 1988 and in September of this year: A united student movement, several courageous leaders, a savvy officer corps, a vibrant middle class and media, a functioning parliament, and mass social-welfare organizations that could fill the institutional vacuum during the turmoil and after Suharto’s downfall. Indonesia’s transition to democracy was not perfect but it wasn’t a failure either. The1999 elections that followed Suharto’s ouster, with the support of the international community, were free and fair; and the 2004 polls—one of the world’s most complex marathon elections—were unanimously declared peaceful by international observers. Indonesia is today the world’s third-largest democracy and it has scored a historic peace deal in separatist Aceh. Though the country isn’t attracting the kind of foreign direct investment it needs, its economy is enjoying its sixth straight year of expansion thanks to robust oil prices and sound macro-economic policies. The sweeping reforms have not all been far-reaching, and security challenges remain, but the Southeast Asian titanic did not sink as widely feared when Suharto was sunk. Myanmar is still a long way off from Indonesia’s level of development before 1998’s reformasi, but Jakarta is certainly well placed to offer its expertise, and it has. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is a retired army general whom Than Shwe has listened to in the past. In early 2005 soon after Yudhoyono was sworn in as Indonesia’s first directly elected President, he visited Yangon to persuade Than Shwe to receive ASEAN’s emissary whom the government had periodically stonewalled. Yudhoyono succeeded. The subsequent ASEAN negotiations with Myanmar faltered but Jakarta’s role should not be underestimated again.
Fearing Intervention
Myanmar fears Western intervention, its army fears national disintegration, and Than Shwe and his family fear revenge. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda labels this condition “psychological insecurity.” Jakarta should know; it experienced the same fears. Yet, Jakarta’s reform process is entirely home-grown, its traditionally independent foreign policy has sometimes put it at odds with the West, and these are its selling points in its dealings with Myanmar’s junta. What’s more, Yudhoyono was also a key architect of military reforms and the Indonesian military’s gradual return to the barracks. Douglas Ramage of the Asia Foundation describes the Indonesian armed forces’ swift and quiet exit from prominence in national politics as “one of the stand-out transformations in Indonesia .” Yudhoyono’s rise to the Presidency is a powerful symbol of what a professionalized and civilianized military can achieve in a democracy. Myanmar’s junta must be persuaded to see that it need not fear losing its power. In truth, the junta once toyed with emulating Indonesia’s economic and then political changes, but found them too messy so it turned instead to the Singaporean model of “flourishing discipline” according to ASEAN diplomats. Gambari’s challenge is to take the best lessons from the Indonesian model with the active participation of Yudhoyono, who recently told Al Jazeera television that he is communicating with Than Shwe. The blueprint can be promoted as a joint UN-ASEAN affair. What’s unknown is how Than Shwe will respond. As Gambari’s latest mission has shown, the general dislikes high-level multilateral talks that infringe on Myanmar’s sovereignty. The upside is that Aung San Suu Kyi has finally released her political statement of reconciliation through Gambari, and preliminary “negotiations” have begun between the SPDC and the opposition. If Gambari, Indonesia, and ASEAN can come up with a face-saving solution that will ensure a soft landing for Myanmar, the ruling State Peace and Development Council might just agree to a transitional mechanism to share power that would ultimately produce a real peace. Haseenah Koyakutty, a Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org) contributor, is a freelance journalist based in Washington, DC and Southeast Asia specialist. She covered Indonesia’s revolution against the Suharto dictatorship in 1998.
———————————————————————————————————————————
